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THE F U N C T I O N A L  VIEW OF MIND 
I. PRAGMATISM AND T H E  CONCEPT OF FUNCTION 
N tracing the development of the contemporary treat- I ments of mind, it was noticed that the realistic movement 
vacillated between regarding mind as a relation among 
factors of the directly experienced world, and regarding 
experience as mental and as somehow imposed between the 
organism and the physical world which is not directly given. 
This second tendency, involving a regression to an earlier 
historical position, was primarily due to the endeavor to get 
enough mind to account for error without unnecessarily com- 
plicating the picture of the world. It is possible that a more 
adequate analysis of mind in experiential terms would keep 
intact the essential insight of new realism that we are 
not confined to our own mental states, and would avoid 
the regression to the “brain-mind” metaphysics of criti- 
cal realism. In avoiding the metaphysical extremes of 
both realism and idealism, the movement of contemporary 
philosophy variously known as pragmatism, radical empiri- 
cism, and instrumentalism, offers an alternative approach to 
the problem of mind. Without failing to appreciate the 
systematic active features of mind, it is able to regard mind 
as operating in a larger non-mental environment which may 
be regarded as ultimately “real” and not as a mere mental 
modification of the world of nature. This approach involves 
the passage from the treatment of mind as bare relation to 
the treatment of mind in terms of function. 
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T h e  term function, like the term substance, has a number 
of meanings which make a precise definition difficult. T h e  
term is often used to denote the normal mode of perform- 
ance of some thing or  organ, as when we speak of an engine 
or  a heart functioning well. Closely related to this meaning, 
if indeed not inseparable from it, is the use of the term 
function to indicate the purpose which a thing fulfils or  the 
r6le which it plays, as when we speak of the function of the 
heart as the distribution of blood, or  the function of a 
particular stone on a writer’s desk as that of serving as a 
paper-weight. There is a third meaning of function, the 
mathematical one, in which one term is a function of another 
i f ,  when a value is assigned to the first, the second term 
thereby receives a specific value. In  the notion of function 
that is to be employed in discussing the fourth type of theory 
of mind i t  is necessary to combine the elements of activity, 
rijle, and concomitant variation suggested in these various 
uses of the term. On the pragmatic position, mentality is the 
characteristic of experience performing in a certain func- 
tional d e ,  and not a characteristic of experience in itself, 
experience as bare givenness being neither mental, psychical, 
nor subjective. T h e  specific nature of this function will be 
determined as the argument progresses. Mentality, then, is 
similar to the status of being a paper-weight: whether a 
specific material object is a paper-weight or  not depends upon 
the r6le it performs, upon the way it is used. T h e  same object 
may therefore be a paper-weight a t  one moment and not a 
paper-weight a t  the next moment. Although functionality 
is undoubtedly a kind of relation, it is vastly more compli- 
cated than the bare relation of togetherness. 
Historically, pragmatism shares with new realism a funda- 
mental opposition to the metaphysics of absolute idealism. 
In fact, these two reactions were not in the beginning sharply 
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separated, Peirce and James, for instance, contributing about 
equally to both the new realistic and pragmatic movements. 
T h e  division that ultimately appeared is perhaps due to  the 
fact that pragmatism nourished itself upon the results of 
biology and psychology, and showed an ever growing human- 
istic concern with the social activities of man, while the new 
realistic movement, shunning psychologism, drew its life- 
blood from the mathematical and physical sciences, priding 
itself upon an aloofness from anything that smacked of the 
social reformer. However antithetical the pragmatic and 
realistic attitudes may a t  first sight appear, there is sdme 
evidence of the growth of an attitude, and perhaps of a 
metaphysics, that is both pragmatic and realistic, the prag- 
matist being forced to extend his doctrine into the fields of 
mathematics and the philosophy of science, and the realist 
being forced to consider the sphere of value. 
T h e  pragmatic movement developed practically simulta- 
neously in this country around the personalities of James and 
Dewey,’ and these two thinkers have remained the com- 
plementary germanating centers of the philosophy. Speaking 
in general terms, it may be said that James has contributed 
a self-reliant individualism, a radically empirical orientation, 
and a metaphysical background, which in its emphasis upon 
the appearance of genuine novelty in the world process, 
opposed the static completeness of both mechanism and 
absolute idealism, a background in harmony with the posi- 
tion now known as emergent evolution. In addition to these 
factors, Dewey has emphasized the category of the social 
in working out the implications of the pragmatic attitude for 
ethics, education, and logic, and represents a more secular 
‘On the history of pragmatism, see Dewey’s article “The Development of 
American Pragmatism,” in vol. I1 of the Columbia Studies in the History of 
Ideas. 
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and critical attitude than is found in James. T h e  character- 
istic difference in temper of James and Dewey is reflected 
in their analyses of mind. 
James only developed slowly in the direction of a radical 
empiricism. In  the Psychology James’ position is that of a 
dualistic realism which regards “mind knowing and thing 
known” as two irreducible elements.’ “Some sort of Jignal 
must be given by the thing to the mind’s brain, or  the 
knowing will not occur,”* and in any case, “the thing remains 
the same whether known or not.”’ In spite of having for  
the criterion of mind “the pursuance of future ends, and the 
choice of means for their attainment,”‘ there are places in 
the Psychology where James practically identifies “mental 
states,” “thought,” “states of consciousness” with the mere 
fact of experience.‘ Thus the stream of experience is re- 
garded as a stream of thought; sensations are called thoughts 
and are regarded as intrinsically cognitive. T h e  bare sugges- 
tion that except for sensations “the stuff of which all our 
other thoughts are  composed is symbolic,”’ is not followed 
by any adequate treatment of the symbol. There is as yet 
no functional distinction of the concept from the percept, of 
reflective from immediate experience. 
T h e  situation has changed entirely by the time of the pub- 
lication of the paper on “Does Consciousness Exist?” H e r e  
James denies what he had previously affirmed, namely, that  
there is any conscious stuff opposed in nature to the realm 
of matter, insisting that “thoughts in the concrete are made 
1 The Principles of Psychology, vol. I, p. 218. 
*Ibid., p. 218. 
arbid., p. 219. 
‘Ibid., p. 8.  
BIbid., p. 186. 
elbid., p. 471. 
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of the same stuff as things are.”’ In the further treatment of 
thought and mind, James really proposes two answers, not 
contradictory to  be sure, but confused and intertwined be- 
cause of James’ failure to  distinguish them. There is first the 
clear presence of a relational theory of mind,’ the insistence 
that the same bit of content can now figure in a mental con- 
text, and now in a physical context, and now in both a t  once. 
T h e  analogy which James gives is the point of intersection of 
two lines. The  perceived room has connections with the series 
of events that are regarded as physical, but the same per- 
ceived room is also an event in the series of events which 
constitute a mind. On such a basis two or more minds may 
know the same thing.8 I t  is in terms of this line of thought 
that  James  write^,^ “a ‘mind’ or  ‘personal consciousness’ is 
the name for a series of experiences run together by certain 
definite transitions, and an objective reality is a series of 
similar experiences knit by different transitions,” a view 
which reminds one of similar statements in Hume, Mach, 
and Russell. This relational theory of mind is used by James 
to  explain mind and knowledge a t  the perceptual level. 
This relational explanation is a t  times applied by James 
to  situations where it is inadequate, as in the case of the 
relation of fire to the perceived room, where he says of the 
room, “in the real world, fire will consume it. In your mind, 
you can let fire play over it without eff ect.”6 Here it is plain 
the perceived fire and the imaginatively conceived fire are 
not just the same content in two contexts, but rather that the 
conceived fire is one portion of experience acting as a 
symbolic substitute for other portions. 
‘Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 37. 
*Ibid., pp. 12, 14. 
aIbid., pp. 39-91, 123-136. 
‘Ibid., p. 80. 
5Ibid., p. 14. 
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In the main, James himself shifts from a bare relational t o  
a functional theory of mind in passing from the perceptual 
to the conceptual level of experience. On this type of 
explanation,’ James no longer regards thought as equivalent 
t o  all of experience, but as concept thought is now separated 
from a percept by the function it performs.* T h e  term 
intellect is practically restricted to this conceptual function- 
ing. A concept is a percept that has become a substitute fo r  
other percepts which it leads to and which it “means.” T h e  
world of concepts can rise to higher and higher levels of 
abstraction, and it is in the noting of the relations between 
these concepts that the formal studies of mathematics and 
logic arise.’ T h e  final value of concepts, however, lies in 
their relation to perceptual experience, in the biological r61e 
they play by admitting of mental experimentation in advance 
of overt action, and by rendering possible the analysis, 
recognition, and manipulation of the perceptual stream.‘ 
‘Whenever,” he says, “we intellectualize a relatively pure 
experience we ought to do so for the sake of redescending to  
the purer or  more concrete level again.’” Since the very 
meaning of a concept can only be stated in terms of the per- 
cepts it stands for, and the consequences for action which 
it suggests,‘ truth and knowledge are to be experientially 
described in terms of the relation of concepts t o  the percepts 
t o  which they lead when acted upon.? 
‘Chapters 4, 5, and 6 o f  Some Problemr o f  Philosophy are the most im- 
portant source for James’ treatment of the concept. 
*Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 61-66, 201. On p. 137 James adds that 
the opposition of thought and things is one of function as well as relation. 
SSonre Problems o f  Philosophy, pp. 51, 52, 67-69. 
‘Ibid., pp. 57, 63, 65. 
5Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 97. 
8Some Problems o f  Philosophy, p. 60. 
IEssays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 52-61; T h e  Meaning of  Truth,  pp. 132. 
140. 
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There undoubtedly remain difficulties in James’ position, 
due in part  to the attempt to treat mind and knowledge as 
characters of both the immediate and conceptual levels of 
experience. While passing towards the position of identify- 
ing mind with what we shall in the future call the symbolic 
portion of experience, James never attains an entirely clear- 
cut view of the symbol. I t  is not fair to make too much of 
an isolated statement written in the course of his own de- 
velopment, but any position which identifies thinking with 
the stream of breathing’ cannot be said to  have attained a 
satisfactory criterion of the mental. 
N o t  hindered by an attempt to regard experience as such 
as mental or as a case of knowledge, the functional view of 
mind becomes much more explicit in Dewey, and to the 
descriptive analysis of mind in experiential terms is added 
an emphasis upon the social factors in the mental process. 
According to Dewey, experience itself is but a “natural 
event” with no cognitive status, but in problematic situations 
where the reacting organism is otherwise unable to effect an 
adjustment, certain portions of immediate experience func- 
tion in a new r d e ,  that is, function symbolically,’ or as Dewey 
often says, function logically. In this way portions of expe- 
rience become ideas or symbols, indications of coming ex- 
periences, instruments, in short, for the reconstruction of the 
problematic situation. As in James’ view, reflective experi- 
ence arises out of and must ultimately return to the realm of 
immediate experience. I t  is the functioning of such portions 
of experience that gives the criterion of mind. Consciousness 
is the locus of such logical objects; states of consciousness are 
“symbols, in short.)’a Mind is “the presence and operation 
‘Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 37. 
‘EJSUyJ in Experimental Logic, pp. 226-229. 
3“The Realism of Pragmatism,” Journal of Philosophy, 1905, vol. 2,  p. 325. 
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of meanings, ideas.”’ Mind is a “system of meanings,”’ the 
“state of things in which qualitatively different feelings are 
not just had but are significant of objective differences.”’ As 
contrasted with consciousness which is “focal and transitive,” 
mind, as “contextual and persistent,” “denotes the whole 
system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of 
organic life; consciousness . . . is the perception of actual 
events, whether past, contemporary or  future in their mean- 
ings, the having of actual ideas.”‘ Mind thus becomes the 
great tool by which man controls his world and himself, the 
symbolic use of the experienced world, and not a substance, 
not a pure act, not the bare passage of experience, and not 
the bare relation of experienced content to the nervous 
system. Mind and matter are not in any sense “static struc- 
tures,’’ but “functional characters.”’ I n  terms of behavior, 
mind may be defined as “the ability to anticipate future con- 
sequences and to respond to them as stimuli to present 
behavior.”’ Finally, mind so conceived may be connected 
with the general doctrine of emergent evolution. 
There is one aspect of Dewey’s treatment of mind that 
must receive specific mention, and that is the conception that 
mind is intrinsically social. Although pragmatism has always 
emphasized the relation of mind to action, and has always 
been behavioristic in the larger non-Watsonian sense of 
stressing the central importance of behavior for philosophy 
(its radical empiricism prevents it from adopting the overly 
simplified metaphysics of Hobbes, Watson, and Weiss) , 
Dewey has consistently opposed the tendency to find the seat 
‘Experience and Nature, p. 290. 
*Ibid., p. 304. 
*Ibid., p. 258. 
‘Ibid., p. 303. 
SIbid., p. 75. 
Creatkie Intelligence, pp. 39, 40. 
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of mind in the individual brain or nervous system, and has 
stressed a position that might be called social behaviorism.’ 
Admitting that mind is the symbolic functioning of ex- 
perience, Dewey has increasingly come to  regard this func- 
tioning as of social origin. While believing that “the 
identification of knowing and thinking with speech is wholly 
in the right direction,”* and while not doubting “that vocal- 
ization, including overt laryngeal changes, furnishes the 
mechanism of the greater part  (possibly the whole) of 
thought-behavior,”’ Dewey regards the Watsonian type of 
behaviorism which neglects the social situation, and which 
makes language a bare succession of movements in the vocal 
cords or movements substitutes for these movements, as 
giving a grossly oversimplified “subcutaneous’1 theory of the 
mental processe~.~ For  Dewey the heart of language is not 
the expression of antecedent thought, o r  the bare fact of 
vocal cord movements, but “the establishment of cooperation 
in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the 
activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership.”’ 
While animals respond to stimuli of the substitutive sort, as 
when the hen moves away a t  the farmer’s motion of throwing 
food, a child learns to react to sounds and actions “as signs 
of an ulterior event so that his response is to their meaning. 
He treats them as means to consequences. The  hen’s activity 
is ego-centric; that of the human being is participative. T h e  
latter puts himself a t  the standpoint of a situation in which 
two parties share. This is the essential peculiarity of lan- 
guage, or  signs.’” On this theory, animals, not having 
JExperience and Nature, pp. 290-295. 
2Journal of Philosophy, 1922, vol. 19, p. 561. 
‘Ibid., 1914, vol. 11, p. 510. 
‘Ibid., p. 509-511. 
1 Experience and Nature, p. 179. 
*Ibid., pp. 177, 178. 
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language, are not regarded as having minds. Mind is an 
emergent characteristic a t  the level of social or  cooperative 
behavior.’ T h e  factor of meaning or  mentality which 
language makes possible is then extended to other events, so 
that the ultimate origin of mentality is social.’ Finally, 
“thinking as implicit speech . . . represents the social situa- 
tion carried over into the habits of the organism. One talks 
t o  himself as a way of anticipating objective consequences 
( that  is, consequences into which the environment enters) 
before they happen.”’ Dewey occasionally speaks of the 
“body-mind”‘ in emphasizing the relation of mentality to  
behavior, but such remarks should not be allowed to  obscure 
his general doctrine that mind is the symbolic functioning of 
portions of experience, and that the ultimate source of all 
symbols, and so of mind, is the language process. 
Dewey has always thought in terms of the social cate- 
gories, but it is not a very bold guess to suppose that the 
identification of the symbol with the language symbol repre- 
sents, in part  a t  least, the influence of G. H. Mead. Accord- 
ing to Mead,’ the symbol, when limited to what he calls 
the significant symbol, arises in those social situations where 
one participant can take the r61e of the other and stimulate 
himself as the other would stimulate him. Speech makes this 
possible, for in talking to others one stimulates oneself a t  
the same time and in a way similar to the way one is stimu- 
lated when others are talking. In  the use of significant 
symbols the user is anticipating a social situation, that is, 
‘Ibid., p. 258. Patrick has especially considered the relation of mind to 
the doctrine of emergent evolution in his book, What ir the Mind? 
Experience and Nature, p. 174. 
Experience and Nature, p. 277. 
’Ratner, T h e  Philosophy of John Dewey ,  p. 103. 
8“A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol,” Journal of Phi- 
losophy, 1922, V O ~ .  19, pp. 157-163. 
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anticipating the effects upon others of the symbols to be used. 
T h e  situation may however be further “internalized,” so 
that one becomes the other t o  onesdf. Thinking as opposed 
to overt talking becomes the conversation of the self with 
the “generalized other.” In moral conflicts, in particular, it 
is not unusual to be aware of an inner conversation, one mem- 
ber of which is the voice of the desires and urges of the 
individual, while the other member is the voice of the 
“generalized other,” the social phases of the self, the social 
attitudes reflected in the voice of conscience. Whenever a 
person acts in the light of what “people” will say, the situa- 
tion which Mead so acutely describes is unmistakable. 
Markey’ has given an interesting elaboration of the de- 
tailed mechanism involved in the Mead-Dewey theory of the 
symbol, but it will be convenient to postpone discussion of 
this, and of the philosophical bearings of the whole func- 
tional approach to mind, until after a more systematic 
presentation of what we may now call the symbolic theory 
of mind, a presentation which, while in harmony with the 
accounts of Mead and Dewey, in attempting to answer the 
question whether all symbols are language symbols, advo- 
cates a wider use of the term symbol, a use which allows of 
the extension of the term mind to certain animals, and to 
situations that are not essentially social. 
11. THE SYMBOLIC THEORY OF MIND 
In approaching the concept of the symbol,* an assumption 
will be made a t  the outset, namely, the assumption that 
reality appears in a plurality of perspectives with organisms 
as the foci or  the centers of the perspectives. I t  is not pro- 
1 The Symbolic Process. 
ZA more detailed account of the symbol, but with no express reference to the 
topic of mind, will be found in the Journal of Philosophy, 1927, vol. 24, pp. 
253-262, 281-291. 
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posed to discuss any of the philosophical problems which 
such an assumption involves, such problems as to whether 
there are other perspectives than those which are organically 
centered, as to whether what appears in a perspective 
appears in an identical form in other perspectives, as t o  
whether the factors within a perspective are dependent upon 
each other for  their nature and existence or  whether such 
factors may pass unchanged in and out of a perspective, and 
as to whether reality consists of perspectives or whether the 
perspectives are perspectives of an “underlying reality.” 
Even the problem as to whether what is given or  experienced 
is a character of the world only in the presence of the 
organism will not concern us. In fact, one of the advantages 
of the symbolic theory of mind is that it is not dependent 
in any way upon the answer given to such problems. All 
discussions of the emergent versus the selective theory of 
sensa leave it untouched. 
T h a t  which is given a t  any moment is a perceptual per- 
spective with an organism a t  the focus or  center. T h e  
perspective called “mine” is mine only in virtue of the fact 
that the body called “mine” is, although only one factor 
among others, the focal factor of the perspective. It is the 
focal factor because even though a t  times the body is not 
given (as when we are said not to be self-conscious but 
absorbed in the “objective” world) i t  can easily be “re- 
covered,” and because while the body varies with the other 
factors of the perspective, the other factors of the perspec- 
tive seem to vary in an even greater degree with changes in 
the body. T h e  whole given visual world, for instance, 
changes with a rotation of the body, and is practically 
blotted out by a closing of the eyes, and is changed by eye 
trouble and the taking of drugs. While such changes can be 
validly called casual, it must be insisted that the body when 
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given is simply one factor among the given, that it shares, as 
Mach would say, the same spatial field with the other given 
factors. Within the perspective there are discriminations to 
be made. In addition to my body, there also appear other 
organisms,’ and other persistent factors of experience which 
can be approached, touched, and handled. These persistent 
touchable aspects of experience may be designated as phys- 
ical objects. There are other aspects of experience which 
cannot be approached, touched, or handled, and which are 
less persistent and stable, such as after-images, emotions, 
hallucinations, kinosthetic sensations. Instead of regarding 
these as mental and of a order different from the physical 
objects, these may be simply called non-tactual or  non- 
physical experience. 
It is possible to make plausible, though perhaps not to 
( 6  prove,” the assumption that certain of the objects which 
appear in my present perspective are themselves centers of 
experience or foci of perspectives. (Of course the belief in 
such centers of experience is not derived by reasoning. Like 
the child’s application of the same name to widely diverse 
objects, there is no reason not to act as if other organisms 
and even other things were not centers of experience. Only 
as the resulting behavior of the objects fails t o  meet with 
conviction in the sphere of further experience is the sphere 
of this belief limited. Panpsychism and radical behaviorism 
represent the two extremes of the process.) If one needs to 
be convinced that some of the organisms which appear in 
“his” perspective are themselves centers of experience, the 
phenomena of language furnishes the most convincing ex- 
amples. Suppose that I say to organism x, “take a piece of 
’The expression of a body appearing in a perspective will only cause 
trouble if one begins with the notion that a perspective is at an instant and has 
no duration. But as Whitehead has maintained, such perspectives are derived 
by a process of abstraction from the “thick” perspectives that are given. 
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paper, start  two inches from the lower left-hand corner, 
draw a wavy line two inches toward the diagonal corner, and 
around the point last drawn draw a circle two inches in 
diameter,” and that I then take the paper and see there the 
same figure that I had intended to  be drawn, then the con- 
viction that the other organism is a center of experience is 
almost irresistible. I t  may be, as Broad suggests,’ that  “the 
position of a philosopher with no one but himself to lecture 
to, and no hope of an audience, would be so tragic that the 
human mind naturally shrinks from anticipating such a possi- 
bility,” but the belief in other centers of experience besides 
our own plays so important a part  in human life that not 
only the pitiable plight of the solipsistic philosopher justifies 
its retention. 
This perspective in which appear the focal organism, 
tactual objects, and non-tactual objects may be called the 
total self-inclusive point of view or perspective. From this 
perspective the “world” can only be the indefinite extension 
and widening of the perspective, the body must be regarded 
as appearing alongside of other bodies and sensible qualities, 
a brain is studied as directly as a color is inspected, and 
causal relations can only be stated in terms of experiential 
sequences. 
Before discyssing mind from this total self-inclusive point 
of view, it must be noticed that this perspective can be broken 
up into two more restricted perspectives, neither of which, 
it is believed, is able to furnish a satisfactory theory of mind. 
The  first of these may be called the partial self-inclusive 
point of view. To  take the extreme case, imagine a person 
lying motionless on a couch in a dark room. Here the per- 
spective has practically been narrowed to  non-tactual given. 
There are some sensations of pressure, there are kinesthetic 
1The Mind and Its Place in Nature, p. 3 1 8 .  
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sensations, and kaleidoscopic intangible visual experiences 
against a black background, but no physical objects are 
directly given. Imagine such a person attempting to analyze 
the experienced meaning of the word “dog.” Upon saying 
or thinking the word, sensations of various sorts perhaps 
appear, together with various images, but little or nothing 
else. The  meaning of the term dog in such a perspective 
appears simply as a non-tactual context. It is undoubtedly 
such situations which have given rise to  the view that mind 
and meaning are private and subjective, and revealed by 
introspection. 
The  second possible perspective may be called the self- 
exclusive point of view. Here  observation is limited to the 
physical objects which appear in a perspective, and thus the 
content of the physical sciences appears, content that is 
genuinely found in experience but which is considered apart  
from other experienced content. If observation is further 
restricted to the interaction of organisms with each other 
and with the environment, then the perspective of the radical 
behaviorist is obtained. From this point of view, all that 
can be observed are the variations in the behavior of the 
organism upon the presence of stimuli, variations, to be sure, 
that are due as much to  the state of the organism as to  the 
nature of the stimulus. The  radical behaviqrist is entirely 
right in insisting that his position leads inevitably to  a 
stimulus-response psychology, and that any reference to con- 
sciousness, attention, sensation, meaning, language, or mind, 
in the organisms observed, is a gratuitous assumption, and 
not an observation, unless these concepts are stated in terms 
of overt or covert bodily behavior. 
There is a natural, but philosophically dangerous, tendency 
to go further, the tendency to interpret the total self- 
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inclusive point of view in terms of the self-exclusive point 
of view. Having taken the self-exclusive point of view to 
other organisms, the observer of such organisms is bound to 
admit that another observer, observing him, the first ob- 
server, would also find nothing (except perhaps visual 
qualities) that could not be stated in stimulus-response 
terms, and the natural conclusion of this taking in imagina- 
tion the behavioristic attitude to  oneself, is to regard it as 
likely that all that is meant by thought, mind, or meaning, 
and even of experience itself, is some kind of bodily behavior, 
whether over or covert, cerebral o r  muscular, laryngeal or 
non-laryngeal. T h e  same transierence of perspective is basic 
to the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, to Watson- 
ian behaviorism, and to  critical realism, except that in the 
former case the content witnessed from the total self- 
inclusive point of view is tucked away in a substantial mind, 
while in the two latter cases the content is identified with 
some behavior of the organism or located in the brain. In  
brief, the whole tendency of thought exemplified in the 
Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, and all of its 
modifications, arises in the attempt to reduce the content 
observable from the total self-inclusive point of view to, or 
to include this content in, the content observable from the 
self-exclusive point of view, and the only way to avoid this 
result is to  refuse to make this reduction or inclusion, to  
refuse any identification of the two views. 
This refusal is defensible. The  most extreme objectivist 
must admit that he is observing something, which he calls 
physical objects, rats in mazes, behavior. H e  also sees colors 
connected with these physical objects. Our primary interest 
in the books of the behaviorist and the physicist is in the 
report they contain of what has been experienced. The  
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words used are to  be taken as symbols of this experience. 
If the writer replies, as Weiss does,’ “for me, ‘I am observ- 
ing’ only means ‘I am responding’; and ‘I am experiencing’ 
also means ‘I am responding,’ ” then the reader may also 
legitimately say that he is not so much interested in the 
writer’s response, but would like to know something about 
the world. If what A observes is “in” A, and if B’s observa- 
tion of A is in B, and C’s observation of B observing A is in 
C, an infinite regress is set up which destroys the whole ob- 
jectivity of the perceived world, and forces the old dualism 
to reappear between the world as experienced and the ‘‘real” 
world that is not directly experienced. The  attempt to in- 
clude the content of one perspective in the content of another 
leads to  the attempt to put the perspective in which the 
organism is found as one among other experienced factors 
into the organism itself. In  this way a contrast between per- 
ceptual and physical space is set up.* The  non-experienced 
physical world is regarded as causing changes in the non- 
experienced physical body, and these changes are regarded as 
leading to or identical with the world of experience, which 
is now located in the organism. In  short, the Galilean- 
Cartesian-Newtonian world-view is present in all essentials. 
In  refusing to admit the legitimacy of the reduction of the 
total self-inclusive point of view to the self-exclusive point 
of view, that is, by insisting upon the irreducible plurality of 
perspectives, one passes entirely beyond the range of as- 
sumptions of this world-view. 
On the basis of the above analysis, it is advisable to return 
to  the total self-inclusive point of view in order to frame a 
suitable definition of mind, particularly since this perspective 
‘“Behaviorism and Behavior,” Psychological Review,  1924, vol. 31, p. 140. 
2Cf. Russell, The Analysis o f  Matter, pp. 252, 2 5 3 .  
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does justice to both the introspectionist and behaviorist posi- 
tions without being reducible to either.’ 
There is a directly experienced difference between the bare 
hearing of a sound or  seeing of a mark and the hearing or  
seeing of such a word as “dog.” One experience is practically 
or totally meaningless ; the other is meaningful. In describing 
this difference it is undoubtedly correct to say that the mean- 
ingful word had a context different from the context of the 
meaningless word or  sound. T h e  former evokes bodily 
tensions, it tends to be followed by other words, it is felt 
as familiar, and in many cases, although not in all, it calls 
out the kind of non-tactual given that is generally called an 
image. But even this difference in context cannot be taken 
as exhausting the meaning of the term dog, which seems to 
“refer” or  “point” beyond itself in some way. T h e  context 
gives a t  best the meaning, not what is meant, for  what is 
meant is a certain kind of organism which has appeared in 
experience, and which can be sought and pointed out if  
necessary. T h e  word “dog” is a now present symbol of the 
now absent dogs. 
Wherever there is this symbolic functioning there are 
things signifying and things signified, something means and 
something is meant. This symbolic relation is clearly acquired 
and involves in the last analysis the compresence of the two 
objects or events in experience. The  phenomenon known as 
the substitute stimulus is so well known that a description 
of it is hardly necessary. I t  may merely be recalled that in 
most animals, if two stimuli objects are presented, the first 
of which calls out a certain response which the other does not 
It may be noted that Pavlov, while insisting that the scientist must work 
from the “objective” position, believes the philosopher must integrate the 
“objective” and the “subjective.” Lectures on Conditioned ReflexeJ, p. 60. 
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call out, by the continual presentation of the two stimuli 
together, the second will finally call out the response which 
originally only the first called out. In such a case the second 
stimulus is called a substitute stimulus for the first, or  the 
response which is thus connected with the substitute stimulus 
is called a conditioned response. 
T h e  symbol may be regarded as an outgrowth of the 
substitute stimulus. I t  is a substitute stimulus, which while 
calling out in some degree the response to the original 
stimulus, also evokes in some form the original stimulus. 
In every case the symbol is a substitute stimulus, but every 
substitute stimulus is not a symbol. 
The  distinction between the substitute stimulus and the 
symbol may be illustrated by the case of Pavlov’s celebrated 
dog.’ It will be remembered that the salivary glands of the 
dog, originally called into activity by the presence of food 
in the mouth, came in time to be called into activity by the 
mere sight of the food, or  the sight of the experimenter, or  
the sound of footsteps, or the sound of bells, and so forth. 
These have become substitute stimuli, observable from the 
self-exclusive point of view. There is nothing about this 
situation that requires the ascription of the term “mental.” 
Suppose however that a t  the sound of the bell, the salivary 
glands not merely functioned, but that the visual image of 
the food was also invoked, then the bell could be regarded as 
a simple symbol for the food, a “reminder” of the food and 
not merely a substitute stimulus for it. A t  a more complex 
level, an odor may elicit familiar responses without being 
a symbol of the situation in which it originally appeared, and 
often the exact moment when the substitute stimulus becomes 
a symbol can be observed, that is, when the original situation 
is invoked or remembered. These examples may perhaps 
‘Pavlov, op. cit., chap. 26. 
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serve to illustrate the difference between the substitute 
stimulus and the symbol. 
Although any detailed explanation of this difference is in 
part  hypothetical, it may be noticed that there is some ground 
upon which such an explanation can be based. If the sight 
of the food in the above case was itself connected with some 
sort of response, as is to be supposed, there is no reason why 
the sound of the bell, in calling out implicitly this response, 
should not call out the image of the food.’ This kind of 
hypothesis would cause the behaviorist no difficulty since he 
could identify the image and the implicit movement, nor 
would it clash with any position which regarded the expe- 
rienced object as being in part  due to the organism, for in 
such a case the movement would simply be part  of the con- 
ditions necessary for the emergence of certain sensa. With a 
little ingenuity such a hypothesis could even be reconciled 
with the realistic doctrine that sensa are selected by the 
organism, not produced by it, for in this case the movement 
of the organism simply serves as one of the conditions which 
determine this selection. Hunter would not wish to use the 
word “image” (and even on the present account all symbols 
do  not involve imagery) , but his position that a symbolic 
response is a “substitute process which can be reinstated by 
the organism, but only where associative. traces of the orig- 
inal process persist in the integration,”’ suggests a possible 
physiological basis for the symbolic process, and if the traces 
of the original process are present in sufficient degree, there 
seems to be no objection to describing this as a rearousal in 
some form of the otherwise now absent stimulus. 
Any portion of experience, then, that has become a substi- 
‘See M. F. Washburn, Movement and Mental Image, chapters 3 and 4, 
*“The Symbolic Process,” Psychological Review,  1924, vol. 31,  p. 488. 
and pp. 30, 31 in particular. 
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tute for and a reminder of some other portion of experience 
may be called a symbol. Or more precisely, “a symbol is 
any given or  experienced substitute stimulus that leads to a 
reinstatement of the original stimulus in a form that is only 
observable from the self-inclusive point of view.” 
T h e  school of thinkers led by Mead and Dewey would 
probably regard this characterization of the symbol as de- 
fective for two reasons : as not sufficiently stressing behavior, 
and as employing the term symbol below the level of 
language symbols. As for the first point, the present theory 
recognizes the closest relation of the symbol to the organic 
process of adjustment, but it does not believe it is advisable 
to use the term response to cover all experienced qualities,’ 
nor that it is necessary to  attempt to identify such qualities 
with segments of physiological behavior.’ The  only behavior- 
ism this present theory would not harmonize with is the 
oversimplified Watsonian behaviorism. As for the second 
point, it is doubtful if  it is necessary to reserve the term 
symbol for socially acquired symbols. In this connection we 
may glance a t  Markey’s treatment of the symbol. 
For  Markey,a symbols arise only in social-vocal situations, 
the material for the symbolic process being found in the 
vocal sounds of the child that have been circularly con- 
ditioned, that is, sounds the hearing of which has become 
a substitute stimulus for the uttering of the sound. Given 
such conditioned circular responses, the voice of the mother, 
when it  repeats a sound of the child that has been circularly 
conditioned, tends to call out the utterance of the sound by 
‘As Markey does, T h e  Symbolic Process, p. 3 3  n. 
‘Neither Mead nor Dewey is guilty of such a reduction, I believe, but to 
avoid confusion the sense in which they use the term must be carefully noted. 
For Dewey, behavior is “more than physical.” (Journal of Philosophy, 1914, 
vol. 11, p. 510) On Dewey’s use of behavior, see Ratner, T h e  Philosophy of 
John Dewey ,  p. 100. 
s o p .  cit., particularly chapters 3 and 9. 
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the child. Further, by a process of substitution, the presence 
of the mother and even objects near her, may become substi- 
tutes for  the mother’s voice, and thereby come to call out 
the vocal response of the child. This vocal response, finally, 
comes to stimulate the child as the previous presence of the 
mother and her voice stimulated the child, and such a vocal 
response, performing the stimulating r6le of another person, 
but differentiated from the other person’s voice by the child’s 
own original responses to his own voice, is a symbol. Symbols 
arise, accordingly, out of the social-vocal situation. Think- 
ing, which a t  first sight does not seem to be necessarily social, 
is explained as the internalization of the social act of 
conversa tion.’ 
Now there can be no doubt that this interesting account 
gives the way in which the majority of the important and 
fairly permanent symbols have arisen, and that the Mead- 
Dewey-Markey account of the symbol is one of the most 
significant analyses of certain aspects of mind in contem- 
porary thought. But a number of considerations make it 
advisable to  hesitate in identifying all symbols with language 
symbols growing out of the social-vocal situation. There is 
some doubt as to whether either the vocal o r  the social 
aspect is indispensable. First as to the vocal aspect. One 
implication of this theory would be that a family of deaf- 
mutes, not especially trained by normal individuals, would 
develop no symbols and no  mental phenomena. This seems 
highly questionable, but since this is open to some kind of 
determination by the study of deaf-mutes, and some check 
afforded by experimental evidence, no dogmatic statement 
one way or  another is as yet desirable. Secondly, while the 
older theory of a gestural language preceding vocal language 
‘Thia particular point, found also in Mead and Dewey, is developed in 
Grace de Laguna’s Speech: I t s  Function and Development, pp. 341-343. 
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is passing into the discard, it nevertheless does not seem 
likely that all gestural symbols are derived from vocal 
symbols. Thirdly, although writing is undoubtedly very 
young in comparison to spoken language, the fact that 
writing was pictographic in origin and only later became 
phonetic suggests that there may have been subsidiary forms 
of symbolism, visual in this case, that have been supplemen- 
tary to, and not derived from, the vocal symbolism. 
As for the social aspects of the symbolic process, the ques- 
tion is as to whether another person is absolutely necessary 
for the symbol, even the vocal symbol, to develop. Admit- 
ting that the case is an extreme one, echoic phenomena might 
occasionally take the place of the other person's voice. 
Then there are certainly sounds in nature which could per- 
form this function, and the onomatopoetic aspects of lan- 
guage would be explained on this assumption. There is noth- 
ing in the hypothetical physiological basis of the symbolic 
process which make it impossible to conceive of the con- 
ditioned circular vocal responses being directly conditioned 
by non-auditory aspects of the world.' Could not a stimulus S 
by occurring along with the (perhaps physiological) stimulus 
which calls out a vocal response become a substitute for the 
original stimulus and thereby call out the vocal response 
directly? Once this is done S' could become a substitute for S, 
and even a symbol of it. Finally, without any vocal response 
a t  all, it seems possible that of two objects experienced to- 
gether, one could become not merely a substitute for the 
other, but could lead to the rearousal of sensory processes 
connected with the other object and in this way become 
a symbol of it. 
*Allport, whose work has been basic to all later theories of language, does 
not hesitate to make use of such an assumption in explaining how language 
first arose. See his Social Psychology, pp. 194, 195. 
The Functional View 237 
If to these considerations be added the further considera- 
tions that the individual and society are correlative, that the 
possibility of the symbol must be found in the mechanisms of 
the individual, and that no sharp line is to be set up in the 
evolution of intelligence from the animal world to  man, it 
may be seen why it is felt to be desirable to adopt a view of 
the symbol that would not restrict the symbol to socially 
acquired symbols, but which would be able to combine 
Hunter’s use of the term with that of Markey’s. Fortunately 
no difference is made in either case in the general theory of 
mind, the question being simply one as to the range of the 
application of the term “symbol.” However used, the im- 
portant thing about the symbolic process is that  it allows the 
appearance in some perspective of objects and situations not 
present in the direct sense in which they were originally 
present.’ W e  have preferred to regard the symbolic process 
as having many roots, and as extending into the animal 
world, the social-vocal situation giving the most effective and 
important development of a process that need not be either 
vocal or  social, but which attains its highest development in 
the social-vocal situation. Should it seem advisable a t  a later 
time to limit the extension of the term symbol to socially 
acquired symbols, the range of mind on the symbolic theory 
would be correspondingly limited but the theory as to the 
nature of mind would not be changed. 
On the symbolic theory the criterion of mind is the pres- 
ence of symbols in a perspective. Mentality is the symbolic 
functioning of events. Speaking in the most general form, 
mind is the locus of symbols. If it is preferred to adopt 
Dewey’s distinction between mind and consciousness, it may 
‘Thus Markey writes, op. cit., p. 138,  “within a symbolizing behavior sys- 
tem there is one part of the integrated behavior which stitnulutes and presents 
absent situations, p a ~ i  events, and possible future eaents-the whole range of  
the universe for which adequate symbols are at hand.” (Italics mine.) 
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be said that consciousness denotes the present functioning of 
symbols, while the phrase “a mind” denotes the entire 
systematic symbolic repertoire of an organism. 
111. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF T H E  SYMBOLIC THEORY 
OF MIND 
There now remains the need of briefly considering the 
symbolic theory of mind in terms of the philosophical, psy- 
chological, anthropological, and logico-mathematical criteria 
which were suggested as tests for any adequate theory of 
mind. In this consideration, certain implications of the 
theory will be suggested. 
To begin with the philosophical implications, it is evident 
that the symbolic theory of mind combines to some degree 
the central claims of the rival theories of mind: with the 
idealists it admits that the content of mind is the world, and 
that mind is an active systematic process; with the new 
realists that the world as experienced is not a collection of 
mental states or  in a mind; with the critical realists (and 
here the divergence is greatest) that the active, unitary, 
“substantial” aspect of mind is dependent upon the unity 
and activity of the organism. 
The  theory also avoids any dualism between mind and the 
experienced world, or between mind and the body. Since 
any experienced content may function symbolically, any por- 
tion of the experienced world may put on or take off the 
status of being mental by functioning or  ceasing to function 
symbolically. To  a large degree the symbolic theory of mind 
is metaphysically neutral and it could be harmonized with 
any one of the typical philosophical theories. On this view, 
a dualism between mind and the world could only arise i f  
the world of experience (and so of mind) is regarded as 
different in kind from the world of “reality.” 
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T h e  symbolic theory of mind is able to  deal with truth or  
knowledge,’ and the converse, error,  provided that truth and 
error  are  regarded as describable in experiential terms, and 
not as requiring a relation of experience to a non-expe- 
rienced reality. By the compounding of symbols, which allow 
of the compounding of meanings, predictions as to further 
experiences may be made, and when the experience as pre- 
dicted is the experience obtained, the prediction is said to be 
true and a case of knowledge. When the completing expe- 
rience is not obtained as predicted, then the prediction is said 
to be false. Just as experience is not as such mental, so it is 
not as such true or false o r  a case of knowledge, all of which 
depend upon the symbolic functioning of events. 
As for the relation of the present theory to the positions 
of the psychologist, the present position, which in psycho- 
logical terms may be called a neo-functionalism, utilizes the 
material of both the existential and the behavioristic psy- 
chologist, while rejecting the claim of either to  give by itself 
an adequate account of mind. Mind is regarded here neither 
as the content of experience considered in its dependence 
upon the nervous system, nor as reducible to  physiological 
behavior. Nevertheless, it may be agreed with the existential 
psychologist that a complete description of meaning requires 
the inclusion of material not observable from the behavior- 
ist’s perspective, and with the behaviorist that  meaning is 
not statable without reference to  the behavior that is 
involved in the substitution of stimuli. 
Because of the fact that every symbol involves behavior, 
the employment of symbols can effect even the glandular 
processes of the organism, and so the present theory is 
‘The topica of truth and knowledge are treated from the symbolic point 
of view in two articles in the Monist ,  1928, vol. 38: “The Prediction Theory 
of Truth,” pp. 386-401; “Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing,” pp. 
494- 5 10. 
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capable of being extended to the phenomena of auto-sugges- 
tion and hypnosis. Time does not permit a consideration of 
the bearings of the theory on such topics as the dissociation 
of personality, and mental disease. 
As for biological considerations, the symbolic theory of 
mind allows both for the tracing of the development of in- 
telligence in the animal world and the exhibition of the way 
in which mind has maintained itself in the selective process 
of evolution. As for the first point, with the present defini- 
tion of the symbol, it is possible to regard the rudiments of 
mind as appearing in animals below the human level. While 
no agreement in the interpretation of the delayed reaction 
experiments can be claimed,’ there is much in such experi- 
ments that justifies Hunter’s use of the concept of the symbol 
in the interpretation of such experiments. At the same time 
it may be admitted that many animals show no behavior 
that seems to require the introduction of the symbol, and 
that wherever mind exists in the animal world, it is probably 
below the level of the language-symbol. So that while 
bridging the gap between animal behavior and the human 
mind, the theory is able to  do full justice to the unique 
development and capacity of the human mind. 
Indeed, man’s place in the world of living beings is due 
to the extensive development of the symbolic process which 
human society has permitted. While even the simple symbol 
may be of some biological value, since the rearousal of the 
original stimulus presents new stimulating features in addi- 
tion to those of the substitute stimulus,* the extensive de- 
‘Markey is willing to admit that the symbolic process is built upon the 
delayed reaction behavior, but does not wish to use the concept of the symbol 
to explain such behavior. 
ZPerhaps what Pavlov says of substitute stimuli may be true here also: 
“the sum of the stimuli acts more strongly than they do separately” (op. cit., 
See op. cit., chapter 8.  
p. 54). 
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velopment of language symbols makes possible the funding 
of many experiences, past and present, and thus makes pos- 
sible the effective organization of social resources in dealing 
with social and individual problems. Symbols may be re- 
garded as mental antennae, the farthest present extension 
of the process which has passed from the dealing with objects 
by touch, t o  the dealing with distant objects by the develop- 
ment of the distance receptors, and finally to the dealing with 
absent objects through the functioning of their present 
symbolic substitutes. In this sense, mind is the furthest 
extension of the learning process, the most effective form 
of making adjustments which the evolutionary process has 
produced and maintained.’ The  relation of the symbolic 
process with the evolutionary process is intimate and 
illuminating. 
Anthropologically, the mind of primitive man is seen to 
differ from the mind of modern man in the number, range, 
abstractness, permanence, and definiteness of the symbols, 
and in their coherence and interconnectedness. T o  ascribe 
the characters of “prelogical” and “mystical” mentality to 
early man is to be in danger of exaggerating the differences 
of primitive and modern mentality. I t  is true that primitive 
man has no adequate technique for  separating the causal and 
non-causal sequences of experience, that  he often confuses 
and identifies the symbol and that which is symbolized, and 
that objects often have different meanings than they have 
for  us, but to some degree all of these factors continue to 
appear in most contemporary minds. T h e  recognition of 
the differences between primitive and modern mentality 
should not obscure the fact that these differences are earlier 
‘Cf. Thurstone, The Nuture o f  Infelligenre, chap. 5. The  social function 
of language symbols is well developed in the previously mentioned work of 
Grace de Laguna. 
242 The Nature of Mind 
and later stages of one cultural process. Although there are 
perhaps native differences between “races” and individuals 
in the capacity for symbolic attainment-diff erences perhaps 
in a process of evolutionary selection-the main differences 
between modern and primitive man are undoubtedly expres- 
sible in terms of social heredity rather than in terms of 
“mental” ability. Also, the recognition of the individual 
phases of the symbolic process (the recognition that however 
important the social factors in this development, the symbol 
requires contact by the individual with actual objects)’ pre- 
vents the excessive emphasis upon the “collective represen- 
tation” aspect of primitive symbols. Here,  as elsewhere, the 
individual and society are correlative. 
Only a word can be said about the logical and mathe- 
matical implications of the symbolic theory,’ and even then 
only the formal aspects of these studies will be referred to. 
I t  has already been noticed that the tendency of the realistic 
philosophy was to withdraw mathematical and logical propo- 
sitions from the realm of mind and the realm of matter, and 
to regard them as inhabiting a unique realm of being, the 
realm of subsistence. The  symbolic theory of mind is able 
to avoid such a realm, and to take account of the genuine 
creativity of the mathematician and logician, by regarding 
logic and mathematics as a development of, and a specializa- 
tion within, the symbolic process. By this orientation, the 
formal studies are linked with and share all the benefits of 
the reflective process. Neglecting the question as to the 
origin of formal propositions and the question of their truth 
1Goldenweiser criticizes the neglect of the technological activities of the 
individual in the theories of Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim on pp. 380-389 of his 
Early Civilization; and criticizes the doctrine of collective representations in 
the American Anthropologisf, 1911, vol. 13, pp. 121-130. 
2This topic is treated in some detail in an article, “The Relation of Formal 
to Instrumental Logic,” contributed to the volume, Ersayr in Philosophy, The 
Open Court Publishing Co., 1929. 
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or application outside of the formal system, it may be said 
that the distinguishing characteristic of the mathematical and 
logical types of reflection lies in the generality of the symbols 
employed (the symbols standing for any other objects that 
meet the specified requirements), in the use of symbols de- 
fined entirely in terms of other symbols (such as the square 
root of minus one, and the point a t  infinity), and in the 
restriction of interest to the interconnection or consistency of 
the symbols (which is expressed in the postulational deduc- 
tive form which the formal studies ultimately assume). 
Symbols have relations to  each other as well as to  non- 
symbolic events, and the formal disciplines study in its most 
general form this interrelatedness and mutual dependence of 
symbols. By being connected with the symbolic process, no 
diremption of mathematical or logical objects from either 
mind or nature is necessary. This  suggestion is fragmentary, 
to be sure, but it indicates that the symbolic theory offers the 
possibility of accomplishing that which has constituted a 
signal weakness of most empirical philosophies, namely, an 
empirical approach to the domains of formal logic and pure 
mathematics. 
Finally, the symbolic theory of mind is not a “silly” theory. 
I t  can do full justice to  mind-it “saves the appearances” of 
mind-without unduly exaggerating the place or nature of 
mind. I t  makes intelligible popular expressions which refer 
to one mind as better than another, which speak of the de- 
velopment of a mind, of the dissociation of a mind, of the 
unity of the mind, of the activity of the mind, and the like, 
Without reducing mind to physiological behavior, the theory 
explains the close relation of mind to behavior. By the 
capacity of mind to  influence behavior, in the fact that the 
rational being is able by the operation of symbols to  de- 
termine in part  his own behavior, is to be found the genuine 
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source and meaning of human freedom, of moral value, and 
of moral responsibility: in the anticipation and partial con- 
trol of future consequences which the operation of symbols 
allows, is t o  be found that earnest stimulation to cooperative 
endeavor which makes man the individual and man collec- 
tively a determiner of destiny and not a mere puppet in the 
hands of Chance. In the socially oriented life of mind is 
found the factor which gives unique value to human striving, 
and which furnishes the only sound basis of legitimate hope. 
CHARLES W. MORRIS. 
